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Abstract Research on cognitive vulnerability to depres-
sion has identified negative cognitive style and rumination
as distinct risk factors for depression but how rumination
would influence negative cognitive style remains unclear.
The present study investigated the relationship between
rumination and negative attributional style and specifically
tested the potential moderating effect of depressive symp-
toms and processing mode during rumination on activating
negative attributional style. After completing the baseline
measures of depressive symptoms, dysphoric affect, and
negative attributional style, participants were randomly
assigned to three experimental conditions: analytical self-
focus, experiential self-focus, and distraction, in which the
degree of self-focus and mode of processing were manip-
ulated. A second set of mood and cognitive measures was
administered afterwards. Results showed that a stronger
positive relationship between negative attributional style
and level of depressive symptoms was found in the ana-
lytical self-focus condition, relative to the experiential and
distraction conditions. This finding suggested that pro-
cessing mode in rumination interacted with depressive
symptoms to predict negative attributional style.
Keywords Rumination  Depression 
Negative attributional style
Introduction
Cognitive theories of depression state that people have
characteristic ways of understanding negative life events
and that those who exhibit a dispositional negative cogni-
tive style and dysfunctional attitudes are at greater risk for
depression (Abramson et al. 1989; Beck 1987). The hope-
lessness theory of depression (Abramson et al. 1989)
postulates that depressive symptoms are likely to occur
when negative life events are attributed to stable and global
causes, when they are perceived as being associated with
other negative consequences in the future, and construed as
implying personal deficit and worthlessness. Considerable
empirical support shows that the negative cognitive style
featured in the hopelessness theory, especially in interaction
with stressors, predicts prospective depressive symptoms
and clinically significant depressive disorders (Abramson
et al. 2002; Hankin et al. 2004, 2005; Scher et al. 2005).
Rumination is another cognitive risk factor for depres-
sion that has received growing attention in the literature.
According to the response style theory (Nolen-Hoeksema
1991), rumination is defined as a mode of thinking that
involves repetitively and passively focusing on one’s
symptoms of depression as well as on the causes and
consequences of those symptoms. The theory proposes that
individuals have dispositional differences in the way they
react to negative mood states and those who respond to a
depressed mood by consistently engaging in rumination
tend to have more persistent and severe depressive epi-
sodes. In contrast, responses that serve to distract one from
depressed mood are posited to alleviate feelings of sadness.
Although the original theory suggested that rumination
should predict the duration of depressed mood or depres-
sive episodes, recent evidence suggests that rumination
also predicts new onsets of major depressive episodes (Just
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and Alloy 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al. 1994). Experimental studies have shown that rumi-
nation (relative to distraction) intensified negative mood
states, enhanced negative thinking and memory, and
impaired social problem solving in dysphoric individuals
(see Lyubomirsky and Tkach 2004 for a review). However,
similar effects did not observe among nondysphoric indi-
viduals, suggesting that it is the combination of dysphoria
and rumination that contributes to the negative outcomes in
rumination (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 1995).
A recent study found that negative cognitive style and
rumination represent empirically distinct (albeit highly
correlated) cognitive risk factors for depression (Hankin
et al. 2007). In an attempt to conceptualize the relationship
between negative cognitive style and rumination in
depression, Abramson et al. (2002) proposed that cogni-
tively vulnerable individuals should be at higher risk for
engaging in rumination as their underlying negative think-
ing makes it very difficult to exit the self-regulatory cycle.
Empirical data support that individuals who exhibit a neg-
ative cognitive style and have the tendency to ruminate
would be more likely than others to have more severe
depressive episodes (Alloy et al. 2000; Robinson and Alloy
2003). Besides, rumination has been found to mediate the
relationship between depression and negative cognitive
style, as well as dysfunctional attitudes and neuroticism,
suggesting that rumination may represent a common
mechanism through which a variety of risk factors affect
depression (Lo et al. 2008; Roberts et al. 1998; Spasojevic
and Alloy 2001). Along with the negative cognitive con-
sequences of rumination that have been found in the
experimental studies, rumination and negative cognitive
style may be dynamically related and their relationship may
be reciprocal in nature. The presence of rumination would
increase the influence of negative cognition on depression
and this, in turn, would increase the influence of depression
on cognition in a way that a self-perpetuated cycle of cog-
nitive–affective processing would be generated during
depression (Ciesla and Roberts 2007; Teasdale 1999).
Recent evidence has suggested that the consequences of
rumination could be moderated by the mode of thinking
adopted in times of distress. Two distinct modes of self-
focus during rumination have been identified that have dis-
tinct functional properties with respect to depression
(Watkins and Moulds 2005; Watkins and Teasdale 2004).
The abstract analytical processing mode is focused on
evaluating higher level causes, meanings, consequences,
and implications of self-experience. In contrast, the concrete
experiential processing mode is focused on the lower level,
specific, and direct experience of one’s thoughts, feelings,
and sensations in the present moment. The theoretical
rationale for this distinction comes from the reduced con-
creteness theory (Borkovec et al. 1998; Stober and Borkovec
2002) and the interacting cognitive subsystems theory
(Teasdale 1999). Both these theories propose that abstract
analytical processing at times of negative self-experience is
maladaptive in depression since it is associated with poorer
emotional processing and overgeneralization (Ganellen
1988; Teasdale 1999). The abstract analytical processing
may also provide event descriptions that are less detailed and
conceptual that might hinder effective problem solving.
Research findings showed that among depressed patients,
an induction of analytical self-focus (the abstract analytical
mode) reduced the specificity of autobiographical memory
recall (Watkins and Teasdale 2001, 2004), impaired social
problem solving (Watkins and Moulds 2005), and increased
endorsement of global negative self-judgments (Rimes and
Watkins 2005) compared to experiential self-focus (the
concrete experiential mode). Consistently, such differential
effect was not evident among nondepressed participants,
suggesting that the presence of depressive symptoms would
be necessary to trigger the negative effect of rumination.
These findings provide support to the mode of processing
hypothesis (Watkins and Moulds 2005) that it is the pro-
cessing mode, and not the degree of self-focus, that
influences cognitive consequences in depression. However,
since these studies did not include a distraction condition, it
would be difficult to draw conclusions regarding the dif-
ferent predictions of processing mode hypothesis and the
degree of self-focus hypothesis. Given that abstract ana-
lytical processing would facilitate overgeneralization, it is
speculated that reliance on an abstract analytical processing
mode during rumination would also amplify and intensify
the underlying negative cognitive style (as featured in the
hopelessness theory of depression) in individuals who are
experiencing depressive symptoms.
In summary, research evidence suggests the presence of
depressive symptoms and the analytical mode of process-
ing during rumination would activate negative cognitive
style. However, little research has directly investigated
how these variables may act together to enhance the effect
of negative cognitive style. It is important to examine the
potential moderating effect directly so as to shed light on
the dynamic relationship among these factors. It is also
imperative to examine how these vulnerability factors
interrelate in order to more fully understand the mecha-
nisms leading to depression, and thus identify the most
appropriate points for intervention and guide the develop-
ment of even more efficacious treatments of depression.
The present experimental study investigated the moder-
ating effect of depressive symptoms and the processing
mode in rumination on activating negative attributional style
(the negative inferences about the causes of negative events).
In accordance with the processing mode hypothesis (Wat-
kins and Moulds 2005), mode of processing during
rumination, and not the degree of self-focus would be
Cogn Ther Res (2010) 34:116–123 117
123
associated with the level of negative attributional style. In
addition to manipulating the mode of processing, a distrac-
tion condition was included as a reference condition so that
the differential effects of processing mode and degree of
self-focus could be directly examined. It was hypothesized
that the level of depressive symptoms would interact with the
mode of processing in predicting negative attributional style.
Specifically, it was predicted that a stronger association
between depressive symptoms and negative attributional
style would be found in the analytical self-focus condition (a
maladaptive mode of processing) than would be found in the
experiential self-focus and distraction conditions.
Method
Participants
The participants were undergraduate students at The Uni-
versity of Hong Kong who participated in the study in
return for research credit. The sample comprised 23 male
and 49 female participants with a mean age of 19.47
(SD = 1.37). The study received ethical approval from the
Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department at The
University of Hong Kong.
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996)
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure of depressive
symptoms that possesses strong psychometric properties.
The Chinese version of the BDI-II (C-BDI-II; Chinese
Behavioral Sciences Society 2000) was used in this study.
It has been reported to have strong psychometric properties
and an internal consistency of .94 in a Chinese sample
(Byrne et al. 2004). In the present sample, the coefficient
alpha was .82.
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Teasdale and Dent 1987)
The VAS was used to measure current level of dysphoric
mood. Participants rated current ‘‘in the moment’’ feelings
of sad/depressed emotions on scales ranging from 0 (not at
all sad/depressed) to 100 (extremely sad/depressed) with
anchors at every 10 points along the scale.
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al.
1982)
The ASQ is a self-report measure that assesses causal
attributions for six hypothetical positive and negative
events along the dimensions of internality, stability, and
globality on a 7-point Likert scale. A composite negative
score can be computed by averaging the values of the
respondent’s responses on the six negative events to pro-
duce a score that ranges from 1 to 7. A parallel version of
the ASQ comprising another six hypothetical negative
events, matched in length and content to the ASQ, was
adapted from the expanded attributional style questionnaire
(EASQ; Peterson and Villanova 1988). These two parallel
versions of the ASQ were used as repeated measures of
negative attributional style and were counterbalanced
within each condition for time of measurement. These
measures of negative attributional style were translated into
Chinese using the translation and back translation proce-
dure. A pilot study with 110 college students revealed that
these two versions of the ASQ had comparable means and
standard deviations, and were highly correlated (r = .73,
p \ .001). Internal consistencies for the two measures were
satisfactory (a = .81 and .80). The hopelessness theory of
depression (Abramson et al. 1989) has de-emphasized the
importance of the internality dimension, and demonstrated
that generality, a composite score computed from the stable
and global items, may show a stronger relationship to
depression than does the traditional internal, stable, and
global composite. Past research reported satisfactory
internal consistency with the generality score, the alphas of
which ranged from .67 to .77 (Fresco et al. 2006; Metalsky
et al. 1987). The generality score was used to index neg-
ative attributional style in this study. In the present sample,
coefficient alphas for the generality score (ASQ-GEN)
were .75 at Time 1 and .81 at Time 2.
Experimental Conditions
The three manipulated conditions were designed to influ-
ence the degree of self-focus and processing mode of
thinking by requiring the participants to focus their atten-
tion on a series of 45 items presented in written form in
Chinese for 8 min (adapted from Nolen-Hoeksema and
Morrow 1993). For the two rumination conditions, 45
identical items that were symptom-focused, emotion-
focused and self-focused were used but with different sets
of instruction for manipulating the modes of processing
(adapted from Watkins and Teasdale 2004). Instructions
for the analytical self-focus condition emphasized thinking
about the causes, meanings, and consequences of each item
whereas the instructions for the experiential self-focus
condition emphasized focusing one’s attention on the
experience of each item. The distraction condition required
participants to focus their attention externally on thoughts
that were not related to self. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow
(1993) reported that items in both the rumination and the
distraction conditions were rated as being equally neutral in
affective tone by nondysphoric judges. The translation and
118 Cogn Ther Res (2010) 34:116–123
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back translation procedure was used to develop the Chinese
instructions and items for the manipulated conditions.
Procedure
After the participants had given their written informed
consent, they completed the BDI-II and baseline measures
of the VAS and the ASQ-GEN. The experimenter then
introduced and explained the manipulation task. The par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of the three
manipulated conditions (analytical self-focus, experiential
self-focus, and distraction), and were told to spend exactly
8 min on the assigned task. Following the manipulation,
the participants completed the second set of the VAS and
the ASQ-GEN. Finally, the participants filled out a ques-
tionnaire asking open-ended questions regarding the
purpose of the study. They were then thoroughly debriefed.
The entire procedure lasted approximately 45 min.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Random assignment of the participants to the three con-
ditions resulted in 24 participants in the analytical self-
focus condition, 25 in the experiential self-focus condition,
and 23 in the distraction condition. A one-way ANOVA
revealed that the three groups were equivalent in their level
of depressive symptoms, dysphoric affect, and negative
attributional style prior to the manipulation. Descriptive
statistics and correlations of the variables are presented in
Table 1. The BDI-II correlated significantly with VAS and
ASQ-GEN at the baseline, suggesting that participants with
more depressive symptoms also reported more dysphoric
affect and negative attributional style prior to the manip-
ulation. Since there was no significant effect of gender and
age on the dependent variables, all reported analyses were
conducted by collapsing across these variables.
Regression Analyses
Multiple linear regressions with forced entry were used to
test the main effects of the manipulated conditions and the
BDI-II, as well as their interactions, in predicting the dys-
phoric affect and negative attributional style at
postmanipulation. There were two independent variables in
the equations: (1) level of depressive symptoms (BDI-II)
was centered and treated as a continuous variable (Aiken
and West 1991); (2) the manipulated conditions were trea-
ted as a categorical variable with three levels: analytical
self-focus, experiential self-focus, and distraction. The three
level categorical variable was then converted into two
contrast-coded variables. FOCUS compared the effects of
the two self-focus conditions with that of distraction, and
MODE compared the effects of analytical self-focus with
that of experiential self-focus. To evaluate the interaction
effect of depressive symptoms, two interaction terms were
created by multiplying the BDI-II scores by the contrast-
coded variables, FOCUS and MODE. Time 2 scores of the
VAS and the ASQ-GEN were the dependent measures in
each equation. The respective Time 1 measure was entered
as a covariate in the first step of the regression equation,
followed by the contrast-coded variables along with the
BDI-II. The final step added the corresponding interaction
terms. Owing to the relatively small sample size within each
condition, influence statistics were performed to check for
outliers. Cook’s D was satisfactory (with values of\0.3 for
all cases) in the regression equations, indicating that no
outlier had an undue influence on the results. An alpha level
of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests (2-tailed).
Effects of the BDI-II and Manipulations on the VAS
Table 2 presents the results of the moderated regression
analysis on the VAS (Time 2). Postmanipulation levels of
dysphoric affect were associated with FOCUS (b = .52,
p \ .001), but were not associated with either MODE or
BDI-II. The interaction terms of FOCUS 9 BDI-II and
MODE 9 BDI-II were also not significant after controlling
for Time 1 VAS. These results suggested that relative to
the distraction condition, individuals allocated to the two
self-focus conditions were more dysphoric after the
manipulation regardless of levels of depression. As pre-
dicted, the two modes of processing were not associated
with the VAS at Time 2 since they were hypothesized to
have equivalent effects on negative mood states.
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among
variables
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
1. BDI-II -
2. VAS-Time 1 .66*** -
3. VAS-Time 2 .60*** .82*** -
4. ASQ-GEN-Time 1 .40*** .37** .46*** -
5. ASQ-GEN-Time 2 .31** .18 .26* .68*** -
Mean 10.74 33.26 32.78 4.34 4.41
SD 6.12 26.17 25.71 0.73 0.87
Note BDI-II Beck depression inventory-second edition, VAS self-
report of sad/depressed mood on a 0–100 visual analogue scale, ASQ-
GEN composite score of generality averaging the respondent’s
responses on six negative hypothetical events along the dimensions of
stability and globality
* P \ .05, ** P \ .01, *** P \ .001
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Effects of the BDI-II and Manipulations
on the ASQ-GEN
Another moderated regression analysis on the ASQ-GEN
(Time 2) revealed a significant MODE 9 BDI-II interac-
tion term (b = .21, p = .02) and the FOCUS 9 BDI-II
interaction also showed a marginal trend (b = .18,
p = .051) after controlling for the baseline ASQ-GEN
(Table 2). There was no main effect of FOCUS or MODE.
Simple slope analyses showed that higher ASQ-GEN
(Time 2) scores were associated with higher BDI-II scores
when conditioned at the analytical self-focus condition [t
(2.25), p = .03], but was not associated with BDI-II scores
when conditioned at the experiential self-focus and dis-
traction condition. This interaction is plotted in Fig. 1.
Subsequent exploratory analyses using dummy-coded
variables confirmed that a stronger positive relationship
between BDI-II and ASQ-GEN was found when condi-
tioned at the analytical condition relative to the experiential
self-focus condition (b = -.33, p = .02) and the distrac-
tion condition (b = -.30, p = .01). These results
suggested that the mode of processing interacted with
depressive symptoms to predict negative attributional style.
These analyses were repeated with mood change as a
control. The same patterns of results were obtained, sug-
gesting that these interaction effects were independent of
the affective change during the manipulation.
Discussion
This study examined the relationship between rumination
and negative attributional style with the hypothesis that the
effect of rumination on negative attributional style would
depend on both the level of depressive symptoms and mode
of processing during rumination. The present findings
provide support for this prediction and suggest that the
processing mode in rumination interacts with depressive
symptoms to predict negative attributional style.
Specifically, the results revealed a stronger association
between depressive symptoms and negative attributional
style in the analytical self-focus condition, relative to the
experiential self-focus and the distraction conditions. These
findings indicate that ruminating in an abstract analytical
Table 2 Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for Time 2
measures on the VAS and ASQ-GEN
Predictors B SE B t DR2
VAS at Time 2
Step 1 .67***
Time 1 VAS 0.81 0.07 0.82 12.01***
Step 2 .09***
Time 1 VAS 0.80 0.08 0.81 10.16***.
BDI-II 0.29 0.33 0.07 0.87
FOCUS 15.85 3.29 0.29 4.81***
MODE -2.68 3.70 -0.04 -0.72
Step 3 .00
Time 1 VAS 0.80 0.08 0.82 9.78***
BDI-II 0.22 0.36 0.05 0.61
FOCUS 15.96 3.34 0.29 4.78***
MODE -2.74 3.75 -0.04 -0.73
FOCUS 9 BDI-II 0.31 0.63 0.03 0.49
MODE 9 BDI-II -0.22 0.61 -0.02 -0.36
ASQ-GEN at Time 2
Step 1 .46***
Time 1 ASQ-GEN 0.82 0.11 0.68 7.79***
Step 2 .02
Time 1 ASQ-GEN 0.77 0.12 0.64 6.45***
BDI-II 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.52
FOCUS 0.21 0.17 0.12 1.28
MODE 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.16
Step 3 .06*
Time 1 ASQ-GEN 0.81 0.12 0.67 7.00***
BDI-II 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.45
FOCUS 0.18 0.16 0.10 1.12
MODE 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.06
FOCUS 9 BDI-II 0.06 0.03 0.18 1.99#
MODE 9 BDI-II 0.07 0.03 0.21 2.31*
Note BDI-II centered scores according to the recommendation of
Aiken and West (1991), FOCUS contrast-coded variable comparing
the two self-focus conditions with the distraction condition, MODE
contrast-coded variable comparing analytical self-focus with experi-
ential self-focus
* P \ .05, *** P \ .001, # P = .051
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Fig. 1 Simple regression lines depicting the relationship between
ASQ-GEN (Time 2) and BDI-II for the three experimental groups
conditioned at the mean value of the baseline ASQ-GEN. The value
of BDI-II is plotted at one standard deviation below the mean (Low),
the mean (Mean) and one standard deviation above the mean (High)
120 Cogn Ther Res (2010) 34:116–123
123
mode activates and intensifies the underlying negative
attributional style in people who are experiencing higher
levels of depressive symptoms. Given that a weaker asso-
ciation between depressive symptoms and negative
attributional style was found in the experiential self-focus
and distraction conditions, the processing mode hypothesis
was directly supported that it is the mode of processing
during self-focus, and not the degree of self-focus that
determines the negative cognitive outcomes in depression
(Watkins and Moulds 2005).
Previous studies suggest that both rumination and
negative cognitive style predict depressive symptoms
(Alloy et al. 2000; Ciesla and Roberts 2007; Robinson
and Alloy 2003) and similar patterns of findings were
also obtained in this sample.1 The results of the present
study, along with the previous research, demonstrate that
the presence of depressive symptoms (which may have
been initially caused by a negative cognitive style), may
further increase the accessibility of negative attributional
style through the negative effects of ruminative pro-
cessing (Ciesla and Roberts 2007; Teasdale 1999). Past
research suggests that cognitively vulnerable individuals
are at higher risk for engaging in rumination and the
present results extend the finding that ruminating in an
abstract analytical mode further facilitates the access to
negative attributional style. It is important to note that
such findings did not suggest rumination creates or
causes the negative attributional style, but did suggest
that it makes the effect more available to those with
elevated levels of depressive symptoms. Given that the
negative effect of abstract analytical processing has been
found in social problem solving, overgeneral memory,
and global negative self-judgments, and that it further
extends to the negative attributional style that charac-
terizes depressed people, rumination in the mode of
abstract analytical processing might be a critical proxi-
mal mechanism that contributes to depression by creating
a vicious cycle of cognitive–affective processing in times
of dysphoria (Teasdale 1999). The findings also provide
further evidence for the proposed reciprocal and dynamic
relationship among rumination, negative cognitive style,
and depressive symptoms. Nevertheless, owing to the
preliminary nature of the findings, future longitudinal
research is needed to further elucidate the direction and
nature of the causal relationships among these variables.
Although negative cognitive style is considered to be a
static, trait-like feature in depression-prone individuals, the
present findings showed that the effect of negative attri-
butional style on depression might depend upon the
dynamic activation of an abstract-analytical mode of self-
focus in times of distress (Watkins and Teasdale 2004).
Furthermore, previous research has demonstrated that the
effect of negative attributional style (generality score of the
ASQ) could be responsive to a mood priming challenge
among dysphoric students with a history of depression
(Fresco et al. 2006). Although the vulnerability-stress
model posits that the effect of negative cognitive style on
depression can be triggered by negative life events, these
findings suggest that the underlying cognitive vulnerability
could also be activated by internal affective and cognitive
processes such as negative mood states and ruminative
processing (Scher et al. 2005).
From the clinical perspective, the current findings sug-
gest that both negative attributional style and the abstract
analytical mode of ruminative processing are important
cognitive factors related to depression. Although standard
cognitive behavioral therapy for depression primarily tar-
gets changing dysfunctional thought contents, which is
necessary and important, one potential way to improve the
treatment efficacy might be to modify maladaptive rumi-
native processing as well. It may be important to help
depressed people disengage from the analytical mode of
processing that is habitually activated in times of distress.
Although distraction could be effective to alleviate tran-
sient sad mood states, the effect of experiential self-focus
implies that teaching depressed people to adopt a nonana-
lytical form of self-focus might both facilitate emotional
processing and improve problem solving in a manner that
would contribute to the treatment process (Ma and Teas-
dale 2004).
Finally, although we have demonstrated the differential
effect between rumination and distraction on dysphoric
affect, we were unable to replicate the findings from adult
samples that these effects on mood are dependent on the
pre-existing level of depressive symptoms. It may be pos-
sible that younger participants may be more labile and
changeable in mood and that their affective responses to
rumination manipulation would be different. Similar find-
ings have been reported in an adolescent sample that both
the depressed and control groups of participants showed
similar increase in negative mood after a rumination
induction (Park et al. 2004).
There are some limitations that need to be addressed.
First, the sample size was relatively small, and the fact that
the participants exhibited only a mild to a moderate level of
depression limits the extent to which the findings can be
generalized to a clinical population. Second, we did
not have a manipulation check associated with the
1 Although this was not the primary hypothesis of the study, for
exploratory purpose, a regression analysis testing the effects of
rumination and negative attributional style on changes in dysphoric
mood was conducted with results indicating main effects of FOCUS
(b = .90, p \ .05) and ASQ-GEN (b = .15, p \ .05) with a nonsig-
nificant interaction effect (p = .12), suggesting the importance of
these variables in worsening depressive mood states.
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experimental tasks and thus we can only infer the behavior
of participants during the manipulation process. Last,
future studies should consider using more sophisticated
methodologies when assessing the effects of rumination in
laboratory to diminish the potential influence of demand
and response bias effects.
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